Introduction
U.S. President Donald Trump has signed two executive orders: one to promote the development of high-performance quantum computers for scientific research, and another to protect government systems from cyber threats related to quantum computers. The United States is positioning quantum computers as a next-generation technology that supports AI, materials science, chemistry, and national security, while also directly addressing the risk that existing cryptographic technologies may be broken by quantum computers. This news shows that quantum technology is moving from an advanced research topic in laboratories to the center of national strategy, industrial policy, and cybersecurity policy.
The “Development Race” and the “Defense Race” Have Begun at the Same Time
What is important about these executive orders is that their purpose is not limited to promoting the development of quantum computers. The United States aims to be among the first to put quantum computers into practical use, while also preparing for the risk of becoming a target of attacks enabled by quantum computers.
In other words, this is not merely support for research and development. It is a policy designed to build both the power to “use” quantum computers and the power to “defend against” quantum computers.
Traditionally, quantum computers have been expected to demonstrate significant power in areas such as drug discovery, materials development, financial engineering, and optimization problems. However, from a national perspective, their impact on cryptography is just as important. Some of the cryptographic technologies widely used today may be decoded in far less time than before if sufficiently powerful quantum computers emerge.
For this reason, the race in quantum technology is not only a race to build faster computers. It is also a race to rebuild the foundation of trust in digital society.
Quantum Computers Will Become the Next Foundational Technology of the AI Era
In recent years, AI has attracted overwhelming attention in the field of technological competition. However, what these executive orders suggest is not the simple idea that quantum computers will come after AI. Rather, they suggest the possibility that AI and quantum computers will complement each other.
AI is a technology that identifies patterns from large amounts of data and performs prediction and generation. By contrast, quantum computers are technologies that process certain types of computational problems based on principles different from those of conventional computers. If the two are combined, they may accelerate new research and development in fields such as materials discovery, analysis of chemical reactions, optimization, and simulation.
In particular, battery materials, semiconductor materials, pharmaceuticals, and chemical processes related to climate change measures involve complex problems that are difficult to analyze even with conventional computers. If quantum computers approach practical use, the speed of research and development in these fields may change.
In that sense, quantum computers should not be viewed as “the next boom after AI,” but rather as a “computing foundation that further expands the AI era.”
What Must Truly Be Accelerated Is the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography
The most realistic and significant impact of this news is that it sets goals for transitioning to post-quantum cryptography, or PQC. Quantum computers themselves are not yet at the stage where ordinary companies or individuals use them on a daily basis. However, the transition of cryptographic systems may not be completed in time unless it starts now.
The reason is that replacing cryptographic systems takes time. In government agencies, financial institutions, telecommunications providers, and critical infrastructure such as electricity, water, and transportation, numerous systems are intricately interconnected. It is not enough simply to replace cryptographic algorithms. Certificates, authentication infrastructure, communication protocols, embedded devices, contract systems, and operational rules must also be reviewed.
Furthermore, there is also the risk of “harvest now, decrypt later,” in which communication data is stored even though it cannot currently be decoded, and then decoded in the future using quantum computers. For government information, medical information, financial information, intellectual property information, and other data that must remain confidential for long periods, this risk is already an ongoing issue.
Therefore, the transition to PQC is not something to begin after quantum computers are completed. It is an infrastructure upgrade that should be completed before quantum computers become a practical reality.
The Essence of U.S.-China Competition Is Not Just “Technology”
Behind these executive orders lies the quantum technology competition with China. However, this competition is not simply about which country will be the first to build a high-performance quantum computer.
In quantum technology, researchers, component industries such as semiconductors, optics, and cryogenic technologies, software, cloud infrastructure, standardization, export controls, intellectual property protection, and supply chains all become important as an integrated whole. In other words, to take the lead in quantum technology, individual research achievements are not enough. An ecosystem that supports the entire industry is necessary.
This is why the United States is now trying to advance policies that include intellectual property protection, supply chain security, international cooperation, government procurement, and standardization. Quantum computers are not a technology that can be completed by a single company or research institute alone. What is being tested is how a nation combines human resources, funding, regulation, standards, and cooperation with allied countries.
In this respect, the competition in quantum technology closely resembles the competition in semiconductors and AI. What matters is not only the superiority of the technology itself, but also who controls the supply chain, who sets the standards, and who earns trust from a national security perspective.
This Is Not Someone Else’s Problem for Japanese Companies
Although these executive orders are policies of the U.S. government, they are not unrelated to Japanese companies. In particular, companies that do business with U.S. government agencies or U.S. companies, companies involved in critical infrastructure, and companies that handle long-term confidential information may eventually be required to support PQC.
Cryptographic migration is not merely an issue for information systems departments. For manufacturers that incorporate communication functions into their products, companies that provide cloud services, companies that handle patents, trade secrets, and research data, and companies involved in finance, healthcare, and public infrastructure, it becomes a matter of business continuity.
Particular caution is required for old systems and long-life products. It is not unusual for industrial equipment, in-vehicle devices, medical devices, and power facilities to be used for more than ten years after installation. Considering that systems designed and introduced today may continue to be used in the era of quantum computers, it is risky to postpone PQC support as a future issue.
For Japanese companies, the starting point is to understand where their own businesses use cryptography. Based on that understanding, they need to develop phased migration plans for communication, authentication, electronic signatures, certificates, software updates, and connections with suppliers.
The Quantum Era Will Not Arrive Suddenly; It Will Begin with Organizations That Prepare
When it comes to quantum computers, excessive expectations and excessive anxiety tend to coexist. It is not the case that all cryptography will be broken immediately, nor will today’s computers become unnecessary tomorrow. However, that does not mean that preparations can be postponed.
What these executive orders indicate is that quantum technology is no longer being treated as “a future that may arrive someday,” but is already beginning to be treated as a premise of policy, industry, and national security. If the United States proceeds with the transition of government systems by setting deadlines around 2030 to 2031, its effects will likely spread gradually to private companies and companies in allied countries as well.
There remains uncertainty about when quantum computers will be put into practical use. However, cryptographic migration and supply chain development take a long time. That is why the important question is not to predict exactly “when quantum computers will be completed,” but to determine “by when we must create a state in which their completion will not cause problems.”
Conclusion
These executive orders show that the competition surrounding quantum computers has entered a new phase. Until now, quantum computers have often been discussed as advanced research or future technology. Going forward, however, they will be treated as issues of national security, industrial competitiveness, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure protection.
Quantum computers have the potential to significantly advance science and technology, while also having the potential to shake the foundations of today’s cryptographic infrastructure. That is precisely why the United States is accelerating both development and defensive preparations.
The winners of the quantum era will not be only the countries or companies that first build powerful quantum computers. They will be the countries and companies that can make use of new computing capabilities while also updating the trust infrastructure of digital society. This news can be seen as an important milestone showing that this competition has already begun.